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CONTRACTS TO INDEMNIFY BAIL IN
CRIMINAL CASES
JAMES V. HAVESt

AN-YONE who has even a passing acquaintance with the law of bail
Cannot help but react as did the Vice Chancellor in Wildes v. Dudlow,' when he said, "I am surprised to find that there has been so much
conflict." The conflict is not confined to those cases which deal with
the validity of contracts to indemnify bail, nor is the conflict new.
Whether or not the diametrically opposed rules now adhered to in different jurisdictions will ever be brought into agreement lies hidden behind
the veil of the future.
To appraise properly the divergent views now prevalent, since no
synthesis can be made of them, it is necessary to inquire into the nature
of bail itself, its purpose and its development. All these considerations
must be given their proper weight before any judgment can be ventured.
The History of Bail
Bishop, in his work on Criminal Procedure, give§ a good definition
of bail. He writes:
"To bail an arrested person is to deliver him in contemplation of law, yet not
commonly in real fact, to another or others who become entitled to his custody,
and responsible for his appearance when and where agreed in fulfilment of the
purpose of the arrest. Bail, the noun, denotes either the process of bailing (in
which sense 'bailment' is sometimes employed as its synonym), or the one or
more persons who thus are made the custodians and sureties."2
Bail usually takes the form of either a bail bond or a recognizance. A
recognizance is defined by Blackstone as:
"... an obligation of records, which a man enters into before some court of

record or magistrate duly authorized, with condition to do some particular act,
as to appear at the assizes, to keep the peace, to pay a debt, or the like.""
A bail bond is a written contract running to the state from the accused as
principal with his bail as surety. The consideration in either case "is the
release of the offender from custody.""
Both Lord Coke5 and Bouvier6 derive the word, bail, from the French
verb bailler, meaning "to deliver." The word, bail, is used both as a noun
tMember of New York Bar.
1. L. R. 19 Eq. 198, 201 (1874).
2. 1 Bimop, Naw CpanxAL PaocEDun

3.
4.
5.
6.

(2d ed. 1913) 197.

2 BL. Coix,. *341.
Ewing v. United States, 240 Fed. 241, 247 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
3 Law Contracts 279.
BouVm, LAw DicroARY (Baldwin's Libr. ed. 1928) 108.
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and as a verb. As a noun it means either the security given for the release
of a prisoner, or the one who gives the security. As a verb it describes the
action by which a prisoner's release is obtained in exchange for security.
The beginnings of bail are lost in antiquity. We know that it existed
at the early Roman law.' It was the duty of the Proconsul to determine
whether accused persons "should be sent to prison, delivered to a soldier,
or committed to the care of their sureties, or to that of themselves." 8 In
arriving at his determination the Proconsul was to consider "the nature
of the crime of which the defendant is accused, or his distinguished rank, or
his great wealth, or his presumed innocence, or his reputation."" Speaking
of the duties of the Proconsul, Scott says:
"The Divine Pius stated in a Rescript, in Greek, to the people of Antioch, that
anyone who was ready to furnish sureties for his appearance should not be
placed in prison, unless it was evident that he had committed so serious a crime
that he should not be entrusted to the care of any sureties, or soldiers; but that
he must undergo the penalty of imprisonment before suffering that for the crime
of which he is guilty." 10 (sic.)
Early in the law, we find that the bail bound themselves for their
principal "body for body, property for property."'1 It seems that this
"body for body" binding meant all that it suggests, and that the bail
suffered the punishment imposed upon his principal if the principal were
not available. 2 Not later than the thirteenth century, however, this rigid
rule, if it ever really did exist,"3 had been relaxed, and the bail escaped with
amercement.' 4 The "body for body" rule indicates that the practice of bail
was derived from the more ancient practice of giving hostages.', Esmein
suggests a somewhat different origin. He points out that in cases of
wager of battle in France under the old criminal procedure of accusation
by formal party, even though the crime charged involved the loss of life
LAW (1721) 393 et seq.

7.

4 WOOD, INSTITUTE OF C=

8.

11 ScoTT, THE CnI LAw (1932)

21.

9. Ibid.
10.

Id. at 22.

11.

4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISi

r

LAW

(1924)

525; HOLMES, TnE COmmON

LAW (1881) 250; Esm=EIN, HISTORY or CONTINENTAL CRUMnNAL. PaOCEDURE (1913)
2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENOmsn LAW (2d ed. 1923) 590.

69;

12. 4 HoLDSWORT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 525; HoLmEs, loc. cit. supra note 11;
2 POLLOcK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 11, at 589.
13. Esmein contends that the "body for body" formula was not carried to Its logical
conclusion and that the punishment incurred by the criminal was not inflicted on his bail,
who, rather, was mulcted in pecuniary damages, which sometimes were very heavy. Esmmn,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 69.
14. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, loc. cit. supra note 11. BOUVIER (Rawle's 3rd rev. cd.
1914) at page 187, defines amercement as "a pecuniary penalty imposed upon an offender
by a judicial tribunal."
15. HoLM S, op. cit. sura note 11, at 248 eA seq.
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or limb, both the accused and the one offering combat were imprisoned,
and could then be set at liberty on sufficient bail "for it was essential that
the adversaries should prepare themselves for the combat."" Pollock
and Maitland have still another explanation. According to them the
willingness to allow men accused of crime to go free on bail or mainprize
was not due to any love of abstract liberty. On the contrary,
"Imprisonment was costly and troublesome. Besides, any reader of the eyre
rolls will be inclined to define a gaol as a place that is made to be broken, so
numerous are the entries that tell of escapes. The medieval dungeon was not all
that romance would make it; there were many ways out of it. The mainprize
of substantial men was about as good a security as a gaol. The sheriff did not
want to keep prisoners; his inclination was to7 discharge himself of all responsibility by handing them over to their friends."'
Whatever its roots may have been, we are certain, at least, that in very
ancient times they grew into the tree we know as bail. According to Mr.
Justice Holmes, who derived it from the earlier practice of giving hostages,
bail is one of the most ancient contracts known to the law.' 8
Originally it took two forms, one known as bail and the other as mainprize. Today the two words are "used promiscuously oftentimes for the
same thing, and indeed the words import much the same thing... but yet
in a proper and legal sense they differ."' 9 The real difference between the
two is this: In the case of mainprize the surety did no more or less than to
promise by recognizance to pay a stated sum in the event the prisoner
defaulted. The mainpernor was thus a simple surety for the appearance
of the prisoner. In the case of bail on the other hand the surety promised
to pay the designated sum in the event of the prisoner's default, and, at
the same time, had committed to him the responsible custody of the
prisoner, thus making him both a surety and a jailer.2°
In early English practice, two different writs represented the two different practices of bail and mainprize, in the case of the former the writ
de homine replegiandobeing used, and in the case of the latter the writ of
mainprize. 2 ' The former was much like the writ of replevin, except, of
course, that it was directed to a prisoner rather than to a chattel.? After
the statute of 1275, which set forth the conditions for the release on bail
of prisoners, and which was held to be applicable both to the writ of main16. Esmn, op. cit. supra note 11, at 71.
17. 2 Pomocz A-o AITALKN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 584.

18. HovuEs, loc. cit. supra note 11.
19. 2 HALY, P. C. (1st Am. ed. 1847) 124.
20. 4 Houmswoa., loc. cit. et seq., supra note 11; 9 Homswonm, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 105 et seq.
21. 9 iHorswoRT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 105 et seq.
22. Ibid.
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prize and to the writ de honine replegiando, the differences between the
two gradually disappeared.'
Although originally all accused of crime, even of the most serious
felonies, were admitted to bail,' various exceptions were made from time
to time as the law grew alternately more strict or more lax.20 Statutes
were enacted both to deny bail in certain crimes and to correct the
opposite abuses of allowing bail too freely and not freely enough. The
problems of who should be admitted to bail and under what circumstances are not new. This pendulumlike swinging of the law finally
ceased with the enactment of the English Bill of Rights,20 guaranteeing
the right of bail, and barring the exaction of excessive bail.
Tlhe Right to Bail
In the United States, the right to bail is guaranteed in the Federal
jurisdiction by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which
provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."
Every state except Illinois 27 has a somewhat similar provision in its
constitution. Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of
New York, which can be taken as typical, provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."
These provisions are nothing more than declaratory of the law as it
existed prior to their adoption. It should be remembered, however, that
after conviction and pending appeal, there is no constitutional right
to bail.2
23. Ibid.
24. 4 BL.. Commar. *298.

25. 9 Hor.nswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 107 et seq.; 4 HoLnswoRsx, op. dt. supra
note 11, at 525; 2 Poluoc3c AND MAryLAND, op. cit. supra note 11, at 585.
26.
27.

1 W. & M. sEss. 2, c. 2 (1688).
BEELEY, BAnL SYsTEm ; C31CAGO (1927) 34.

28. Thus, in People v. Lohmen, 2 Barb. 450 (N. Y. 1848), the defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor, and the conviction had been affirmed by the General Term of
the Supreme Court. He thereupon sued out a writ of error to the Court of Appeals. Whilo
in custody awaiting the judgment of the Court of Appeals a writ of habeas corpies was sued
out to obtain his release on bail. Denying the writ, the court said:
"Nor do I agree with the counsel for the prisoner, that in the present case the only
question for my determination is whether bail will secure the appearance of the prisoner
to abide by the judgment of the Court. Bail in criminal cases rests upon a different bash.
The reason for taking bail is, that the guilt of the prisoner is doubtful. When the guilt
is past dispute, he ought not to be bailed. The law then demands that his punishment
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The right as it exists in this country is of the same quality as the
right to bail in England under the Bill of Rights. The character of the
right was well illustrated in the case of Regina v. Badger.-' The accused had been arrested as a result of his participation in the Chartist
riots which plagued England in the early Forties of the last century.
He offered as bail two financially responsible individuals of good character. The magistrate rejected them for the sole reason that they had
attended meetings of a labor union in which the defendant was interested. The refusal was undoubtedly occasioned by the public clamor
of the times and by the injunction issued to all magistrates by the
government to enforce the law strictly. None the less the court, while
admitting the good faith of the magistrates, condemned their lack of
a proper judicial approach to the matter before them, and pointed out
that the prisoner should have been released.
The right to bail is not absolute and may be, and usually is, regulated
by statute. While a proper court may admit to bail even in cases of
treason,30and while this is a departure from the older rule which barred
bail in capital cases, 1 and while the only limitation placed on the courts
is not to exact excessive bail,32 still the courts, in deciding whether or
not to admit a particular prisoner to bail, may consider other elements
than the mere amount.
In an old New York case, People v. Ferris,3 the prisoner was charged
with grand larceny. He had been found in possession of the stolen
property. The court's opinion denying the application for bail not
only enunciates a sound rule but gives New Yorkers an interesting
glimpse of the uses to which one of the islands in the East River was
put more than a century ago:
"Ferris is one of the gang of felons that for some time past have infested
the city and vicinity; carrying their plunder and the fruit of their crimes,
to that well known establishment, Ward's Island, in the East River, above
the city. By the vigilence of the police officers of this city, this nest of
depredators and thieves has been broken up and some of them convicted.
They were found in the actual possession of large quantities of stolen property. Now, the practice of this Court has been, when a person was found in
the possession of the articles stolen, not to bail him. This has been our
constant practice, and we can see no good cause to alter it in reference to
shall be certain-and will not tolerate any facilities for his e-cape."
sup a at 454.

People v. Lohmen,

See also United States v. St. John, 254 Fed. 794 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913).

29. 4 Q. B. 463, 114 Eng. Reprints 975 (143).
30. United States v. Stewart, 2 Dail. 343 (U. S. 1795); United States v. Hamilton,
3 DaB. 17 (U. S. 1795).
31. CHAsE's BrAcxsocam (4th ed. 1918) 1001.
32.

Ibid.

33. 1 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 19 (N. Y. 1522).
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the prisoner. It is a general rule that embraces the case before us; we therefore refuse the motion."
The practice of giving bail is regulated by statute in every state. In

almost all states it is required that the bail be a resident and a householder or freeholder therein.8 4 In other states it is provided that the

bail may be rejected unless they reside within the county in which
the case is pending.$5 In some states it is provided that one surety is
sufficient,36 while others require at least two sureties,"1 and still others
require no co-surety if the one surety is a surety company. 8

Many

states require that the bail have a net worth at least equal to the
amount of the recognizance, 0 while other states require that the bail
have a net worth at least twice the amount of the recognizance. 40
34. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 3376; ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928)
§ 5162; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1935) § 1279; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 19-2810; IND.
STAT. Axm. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1031; IOWA CODE (1935) § 13619; MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
(Choate Supp., 1928) § 12142; NEv. CoMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1930) § 11116; N. M. STAT.
ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 105-2308; N. Y. CODE CaR=. PRAc. (Gilberts, 1936) § 569;
N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, Supp. 1935) § 781; N. D. Com. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 7504;
ORE. CODE ANN. (1935) § 13-1317; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 16; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932)
§ 258; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 104-44-14.
35. Amrz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5162; CAL.. PEN. CODE (Deering,
1935) § 1279; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 19-2810; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933)
§ 9-1031; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. (Choate, Supp. 1928) § 12142; N. M. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1929) § 105-2308; OHIO GN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 13524; UTAH REV.
STAT. ANN. (1933) § 105-44-14.
36. APa. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1931) § 450; ILL. REv. STAT. ANN.
(Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 615; IN. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1031; IOWA CODE
(1935) § 13619; MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op. 1933) c. 226, § 3; Mo. STAT. ANN.
(Vernon, 1932) § 3578; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 105-2308; N. Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. (Gilberts, 1936) § 569; OHo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 13524; R. I.
GEN. LAWS (1923) § 16.
37. ArA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 3376; Asuz. REV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928)
§ 5162; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1935) § 1279; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 19-2810; MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. (Choate, Supp. 1928) § 12142; NEv. Com. LAWS (Hillyer, 1930) § 11116;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1935) § 781; N. D. Com. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 7504;
ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 13-1317; S. C. Coon (Michie, 1932) § 258; TENN. CODE (Will.
Shan. & Harsh, 1932) § 11669; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 105-44-14; WIS. STAT.
(1935) § 361.20.
38. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1031; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtrdgbt, 1929)
§ 105-2308; N. Y. CODE CPm. PROC. (Gilberts, 1936) § 569; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923)
§ 16; VT. PuB. LAWS (1934) § 1243.
39. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 3376; ARiz. RED. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928)
§ 5162; IOWA CODE (1931) § 13619; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 3578; N. Y. CODE
CPnM. PROC. (Gilberts, 1936) § 569; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 6310, § 16.
40. ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Maset, Supp. 1931) § 450; CAL. PEN. Coon (Deering,
1935) § 1279; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 19-2810; hL. REv. STAT. ANN. (SmithHurd, 1935) c. 38 § 615; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1031; MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
(Choate, Supp. 1928) § 12142; NEB. Com'. STAT. (Supp. 1931) § 29-901; NEv. Com. LAWS
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While the particular requirements vary from state to state, there
is no state that by statute or by its case law prevents a court from
considering as determinants of the amount of bail, the prisoner's character, his previous criminal record, the doubt, if any, that exists regarding his guilt and the probability of his appearance at the time
set for trial. From time immemorial these considerations have always
been accorded prime importance by the courts.
The Bail as Jailer
Even before the old writ of mainprize fell into disuse and the simple
suretyship it represented was displaced by bail in the true sense, the
bail was considered to be the prisoner's jailer.4 This was true also in
France. An old anonymous case43 puts the rule in this colorful language, "The bail have their principal always on a string, and may pull
the string whenever they please, and render him in their own discharge."
In the Federal jurisdiction, the same relationship has been reduced
to statute, providing:
"Any party charged with a criminal offense and admitted to bail, may,
in vacation, be arrested by his bail, and delivered to the marshal or his
deputy, before any judge or other officer having power to commit for such
offense." 44
This rule, making the bail a jailer, has resulted in several interesting
decisions. In Ex parte Lyne,43 a prisoner out on bail appeared as a
witness in another case. Immediately upon concluding his testimony
he was taken by his bail to be surrendered. A motion to discharge him
was denied, the court stating: "A witness who had given bail was always
supposed to be in custody of his bail, even whilst he was attending as
0 a non-resident had been
a witness in court." In Adamy v. Parkhurst,"
arrested and was later released on bail. While still in the jurisdiction
he was served with process in another case. The court held him im(Hillyer, 1930) § 11116; N. M. STAT. Azm. (Courtright, 1929) § 105-2303; N. C. CoDE
A.NN. (Michie, Supp. 1935) § 781; N. D. Coim. Lws A.n. (Supp. 1925) § 7504; Omo
GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 13524; ORE. CoDE A_=. (1930) § 13-1317; S. C. CODE
(Aichie, 1932) § 258; T,¢nr. CODE (Will. Shan. & Harsh, 1932) § 11669; TEX. SrAT. REV.
(Vernon, 1936) § 277; U r. R-v. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 105-14-14; Wis. ST,%T. (1933)
§ 361.20.
41. 2 HAWX., P. C. (Sth ed. 1824) 140; 1 HAE. P. C. (1st Am. ed. 1847) 325; Hoturms,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 249; 2 PoLLocx AND M zAmThA,op. dt. supra note 11, at 5S89;
WnARoxr, CpanAL PLEADInG AND PRAcriE (9th ed. 1889) § 62.
op. dt. supra note 11, at 71.

42.

Esmmxni,

43.

6 Mod. 231, 87 Eng. Reprints 982 (1669).

44.
45.
46.

Rev. Stat. § 1018 (1875), 18 U. S. C. A. § 599 (1927).
3 Stark. 132, 171 Eng. Reprints 798 (1822).
61 F. (2d) 517 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
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mune from the service of process until the indictment was disposed of,
even though he was physically at large, because he was in the custody
of his sureties as jailers, and such custody was a continuation of the
imprisonment. A view, the direct opposite of that in the Adamy case,
was taken by the New York courts on substantially similar facts in
Netograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham.4 7 In the Netograph case the court
held the service good on the theory that the only non-residents immune
from service are those who come voluntarily into the jurisdiction, and
that a prisoner out on bail cannot be said to have come into the jurisdiction voluntarily as his bail are really his jailers. Recognizing the
existence of a contrary view, the court said:
"Under such circumstances he cannot be said to be free to come at will,
and when he submits himself to the directions of the courts having cognizance
of the charge against him, he does not act voluntarily, but under compulsion of law. We are aware that this view is apparently at variance with some
decisions in other jurisdictions, notably in England, but we think the administration of justice will be best subserved by keeping the rule of privilege within
the reason upon which it rests. That reason fails unless the person claiming
the privilege is a free moral agent who may come into or depart from the
jurisdiction or not as he pleases."
So great is the bail's power as a jailer that if the bail be forfeited
he may arrest the fugitive summarily. 8 If the fugitive has gone to
another jurisdiction the bail need not resort to extradition because the
fugitive is still constructively considered to be within the control of
the first state. 49 Lest there be any misunderstanding, it should be made
clear that the bail are not jailers in a physical sense. All that is meant
by the expression is that they might at any time, for reasons sufficient
to themselves, surrender the prisoner, and thus exonerate themselves.
An excellent statement of the rule is found in Reese v. United States:1 °
"By the recognizance the principal is, in the theory of the law, committed
to the custody of the sureties as to jailers of his own choosing, not that he
is, in point of fact, in this country at least, subjected or can be subjected by
them to constant imprisonment; but he is so far placed in their power that
they may at any time arrest him upon the recognizance and surrender him
to the court and, to the extent necessary to accomplish this, may restrain him
of his liberty. This power of arrest can only be exercised within the territory
of the United States; and there is an implied covenant on the part of the
principal with his sureties when he is admitted to bail, that he will not
47.

48.
49.
46 F.
50.

197 N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962 (1910).

Ex parte Salinger, 288 Fed. 752 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923).
in re Von der Ahe, 85 Fed. 959 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1898); Fitzpatrick v. Wil1a=i,
(2d) 40 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
9 WalL 13 (U. S. 1869).
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depart out of this territory without their assent. There is also an implied
covenant on the part of the Government, when the recognizance of bail is

accepted, that it will not in any way interfere with this covenant between them,
or impair its obligation, or take any proceedings with the principal which Will

increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedy against him."
In the Reese case, incidentally, it was held that the bail was discharged
because the prosecution had indefinitely adjourned the trial of the case
without their knowledge or consent, thus varying the terms of their
recognizance.
Many other cases dealing with what constitutes an act sufficient to
discharge the bail give illustrations of the bail's position as a jailer.
A few examples will suffice. In Devine v. The State,"1 it was held that
the arrest of the prisoner in another state for another crime between
the time he was bailed and the time his case was called for trial did
not discharge the bail as they "... . had the control of his person; they
were bound at their peril to keep him within their jurisdiction, and to
have his person ready to surrender when demanded." A similar situation
. 2 There again the court held that
was presented in Taylor v. TaintorY
the arrest in another jurisdiction did not discharge the bail. Speaking
of their rights as jailer, the court said:
"They may doubtless permit him to go beyond the limits of the State
within which he is to answer, but it is unwise and imprudent to do so; and if
any evil ensue, they must bear the burden of the consequences, and cannot
cast them upon the obligee."
In Kentucky, at least, the rule of Taylor v. Taintor is somewhat
modified. There the bail of one under indictment for felony do not
act at their peril when they permit the accused to leave the State on
a visit, and they are not absolutely liable in the event he is prevented
from returning in time for his trial because of an unavoidable accident
to his person. 3
Truly, a prisoner released on bail may accurately express both his
position and the principle involved in the cases by saying: "I am out on
bail; I am still in jail."
51. 5 Sneed 622 (Tenn. 1858).
52. 16 WalL 366 (U. S. 1872); see also State v. Merrihew, 47 Iowa 112 (1877).
53. Hargis v. Begley, 129 Ky. 477, 112 S. W. 602; 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 136 (1903).

The

principle finds expression, too, in cases where the bailed person has become insane. There
are two Kentucky cases, in one of which, Briggs v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 340, 214 S. W.

975 (1919), the prisoner was adjudicated insane and confined to an institution, whereupon
the bail was held to be discharged. In the other, Commonwealth v. Allen, 157 Ky. 6, 162
S. W. 116 (1914) the prisoner went insane and disappeared. There was no adjudication

of insanity, he was not in the custody of the state, and his bail was held not to be
discharged.
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Contract to Indemnify Bail
We have seen that bail is a means used through the centuries to
enable those accused of crime to maintain their liberty, until they have
been found guilty, upon the giving of adequate security for their appearance when needed. We have seen, too, that the cases generally
consider the bail to be the accused's jailer, that in theory when one
is out on bail, his imprisonment is deemed to be continued. The primary interest of society when it releases a prisoner on bail is not to
barter a specified amount of cash or property for the prisoner's future
freedom, but rather to receive every reasonable assurance under the
circumstances that the accused will be on hand when his case is called
for trial. Society is injured, even though the full amount of the bail
posted is paid to it, if the accused fails to put in an appearance. Of
course, the charge still stands, and the fugitive may be tried whenever
he is apprehended. When the bail make good the forfeiture, they do
nothing more than release themselves.
As bail operates at the present time, there is an alarming number of
forfeitures.5 4 Society is ill-served indeed when its bail system produces
frequent forfeitures and an equal or almost equal number of fugitives,
who are free to continue their criminal careers. These considerations
are of pertinence in a review of the cases dealing with contracts to indemnify bail.
In England it is well settled that contracts to indemnify bail are unenforceable as against public policy. 5 While a few American jurisdictions have adopted the English rule, 0 the majority American rule
is that such contracts are good and enforceable. 7 The text writers are
of little help in setting forth any definite rule. 8
54.

Legis. (1921) 21 CoL. L. REV. 592; BEELEY, op. cit. supra note 27, at 156.

55. Jones v. Orchard, 16 C. B. 614; 139 Eng. Reprints 900 (1855); Wilson v. Strugnell,
7 Q. B. D. 548 (1880); Herman v. Jeuchner, 15 Q. B. D. 561 (1885); Consolidated Exploration & Finance Co. v. Musgrave (1900) 1 Ch. 37; King v. Porter (1910) 1 X. B. 369.
56. Dunkin v. Hodge, 46 Ala. 523 (1871); Slater v. Jacobitz, 3 Colo. App. 127, 32
Pac. 184 (1893).
57. Leary v. United States, 224 U. S. 567 (1912); McCormick v. Boylan, 83 Conn. 686,
78 At]. 335 (1910); Simpson v. Robert, 35 Ga. 180 (1866); Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind.
315 (1880); Ellis v. Norman, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1798, 44 S. W. 429 (1898); Maloney v.
Nelson, 144 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. 82 (1894) ; Maloney v. Nelson, 158 N. Y. 351, 53 N. E. 31
(1899); Fagin v. Goggin, 12 R. I. 398 (1879); Reynolds v. Harral, 2 Strob. 87 (S. C.
1847); Essig v. Turner, 60 Wash. 175, 110 Pac. 998 (1910); Carr v. Davis, 64 W. Va. 522,
63 S.E. 326 (1908); Carr v. Sutton, 70 W. Va. 417, 74 S.E. 239 (1912).
58. "In view of the fact that contracts for the indemnity of sureties upon ball
bond in criminal cases have been frequently enforced in the courts, it is strong evidenco
that they have been presumed, by the bar and bench, to be legal.' PmoREY, SunBTasnv
AwD GuARANrY (2d ed. 1913) § 416.
"If the principal do not appear, and the recognizance be forfeited, and paid by the ball;
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The earliest English case dealing with the subject is that of Jones v.
Orchard5 9 There the bail brought action against his principal on an

implied indemnity for the costs which the bail had been forced to pay,
his principal having failed to do so. There had been no default of appearance on the principal's part. While the court allowed recovery,
holding that an implied indemnity to pay the costs was not against

public policy, it expressly refrained from passing on the legality of
indemnity in case of a personal default, stating:
"It is unnecessary to decide that point on the present occasion, although
we are inclined to think the objection well founded, and that such contract
would be contrary to public policy, inasmuch as it would be in effect giving
the public the security of one person only, instead of two.2co

A few years later Cripps v. Hartnoll,0 ' dealing with an express promise
of indemnity running from a third person, the father of the defendant,
to the bail, held such a promise not within the Statute of Frauds but an

original agreement. The case did not consider the public policy involved in such an agreement, although Baron Pollock said, "Here the
bail was given in a criminal proceeding; and, where bail is given in
such a proceeding, there is no contract on the part of the person bailed
to indemnify the person who became bail for him." Although the Cripps
yet the principal shall remain open and liable to the law whenever he can be taken, for
the penalty in the recognizance is no other than as a bond to compel the bail to a due
observance thereof, and has no connection with the principal; they could not sue him
thereon, for money paid to his use, or on his account, for it was paid on their own
account, and for their own neglect; but having paid it, they are wholly exonerated, though
Er[IrGorP, BAMr. (1783) 204.
the offender remains liable for his offence."
"The principal undertakes impliedly to indemnify the bail from all expence3 fairly arising from his situation as bail. If, therefore, the principal absconds, so that he cannot
be rendered, the bail may take every proper step to secure him, and the principal wil be
liable to the bail for the expenses thereby incurred." 3 Psrmsnon r, Anmmvarrai (Am.
ed. 1829) 200.
While Petersdorff's comment has been relied on as authority for the proposition that an
indemnity contract in a criminal case is good, it is likely that Peteradorff intended to enundate nothing more than the rule in civil cases. He cites as his authority Fisher v. Fallows,
5 Esp. 171, 170 Eng. Reprints 775 (1S04), which was a civil case. In this connection it is
interesting to note that even the authority on which Petersdorff relied may not be trustworthy. Lord Denman, speaking of Espinasse's Reports in Small v. Nairne, 13 Q. B.
S40, 844, 116 Eng. Reprints 1484, 1486 (1849) said:
"I am tempted to remark, for the benefit of the profession, that Espinae's Reports,
in days nearer their own time, when their want of accuecy was better known than
it is now, were never quoted without doubt or hesitation; and a special reason was given
as an apology for citing that particular case. Now they are often cited as if counel thought
them of equal authority with Lord Coke's Reports."
59. 16 C. B. 614, 139 Eng. Reprints 900 (1855).
60. Jones v. Orchard, 16 C. B. 614, 624, 139 Eng. Reprints 900, 904 (185S).
61. 4 B. & S. 415, 122 Eng. Reprints 514 (1863).
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case was silent on the public policy involved, it might be argued that
if the court thought such a contract against public policy, it would have
said so. If there were no later cases the Cripps case might conceivably
be urged as an authority for the proposition that an indemnity agreement is good.
However, in 1880 we find the case of Wilson v. Strugnell, 2 in the
Queen's Bench Division. There one Manners, who was charged with
embezzlement, had been released on bail posted by the defendant Strugnell. Manners had paid Strugnell £100, the amount of the bail, as
security. Later Manners defaulted, and still later, was adjudicated
bankrupt, the plaintiff being appointed his trustee. There had been
no forfeiture. The action was brought to recover from Strugnell the
indemnity paid to him by Manners. The court gave as its reason for
allowing recovery that a contract to indemnify bail was against public
policy in that it deprived the public of the security of the bail. It mentioned that aside from this consideration it felt it was bound by the
holding in Jones v. Orchard.
Later in Herman v. Jeuchner,63 the court allowed the plaintiff, who
had been ordered to post a bond for his good behavior for two years,
to recover from his surety the indemnity he had paid. The case reenunciates the principle that an indemnified surety lacks a proper interest in caring for the observance of the necessary condition by the
principal, and that, accordingly, a contract to indemnify a surety is
against public policy. The case goes further than any of the prior decisions in that it permits the principal to recover the amount of indemnity from his bail.
A somewhat different fact situation, but the same principle, were involved in ConsolidatedExplorationand Finance Company v. Musgrave. 4
There the defendant went bail for one Ainsworth and one Jordan, who
were charged with criminal fraud. Ainsworth apparently had some
connection with the plaintiff. Ainsworth and Jordan agreed with the
defendant to deliver to him as indemnity for the bail certain preference
shares in the London Woolen Co., title to which was vested in the plaintiff. After the shares had been delivered to the defendant, and the bail
posted, Jordan absconded, and the bail was estreated.Y5 An authorization for the delivery of the shares to the defendant was contained in
the plaintiff's minute book. Holding that the contract between Ainsworth
62.

7 Q. B. D. 548 (1880).

63.

15 Q. B. D. 561 (1885).

64. (1900) 1 Ch. 37.
65. A forfeited recognizance taken out from among the other records for the purpose
of being sent up to the exchequer, that the parties might be sued thereon, was said to be
estreated. Bouvx=, LAw DicTioNARY (Baldwin's Libr. et. 1928) 366; 4 BL. Co.mm. *253.
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and Jordan on the one hand, and the defendant on the other, was illegal
and void, the court ordered the defendant to return the shares to the
plaintiff, thus according to a third party indemnitor the right to recover
the indemnity paid bail.
These cases settled the law of England so that it can now be said
unequivocally that a contract to indemnify the bail is illegal and void
in England as against public policy, whether the contract runs to the
bail from the accused person or from some third person. But the English courts have gone further than any other jurisdiction and to a limit
which many would consider extreme in King v. Porter."" There they
held that an agreement to indemnify the bail in a criminal case constituted a criminal conspiracy, even though there was no allegation in
the indictment and, of course, no finding by the jury, that it was
entered into with intent to obstruct and pervert the course of justice.
In the course of its opinion, the court said:
"It is, in our opinion, difficult to conceive any act more likely to tend to
produce a public mischief than that which was done in this case. It is to the
interest of the public that criminals should be brought to justice, and, therefore, that it should be made as difficult as possible for a criminal to abscond;
and for many years it has been held that not only are bail responsible on
their recognizance for the due appearance of the person charged, but that,
if it comes to their knowledge that he is about to abscond, they should at
once inform the police of the fact. It has been suggested to us that the
more modem view of bail is that it is a mere contract of suretyship, and that
an agreement to indemnify bail, therefore, does not involve any illegality. If
that were so, as soon as the bail had got his indemnity, he would have no
interest whatever in seeing that the accused person was forthcoming to take
his trial, and it is obvious that criminals, particularly if possessed of means,
would very frequently abscond from justice."
In this country only two states, Colorado 7 and Alabama, c have held
indemnity agreements to be bad, and in the Alabama case it was found
as a fact that the bail had been posted and the indemnity agreement
entered into in order to facilitate the escape of the prisoner. Likely,
any state would hold bad an indemnity agreement entered into for the
purpose of obtaining the freedom of the prisoner so that he could
escape.
The earlier Federal cases all held that an agreement to indemnify
the bail was against public policy, the reasoning being the same as that
of the English cases." The effect of these rulings was set aside, how66. (1910) 1 K. B. 369.
67. Slater v. Jacobitz, 3 Colo. App. 127, 32 Pac. 184 (1893).
68. Dunkin v. Hodge, 46 Ala. 523 (1871).
69. United States v. Ryder, 110 U. S. 729 (1883); United States v. Simmons, 47 Fed.

575 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1891); United States v. Greene, 163 Fed. 442 (C. C. W. D. Va.
190S); United States v. Lee, 170 Fed. 613 (S. D. Ohio 1909).
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ever, by Leary v. United States,70 where the court found nothing objectionable in an indemnity running from the accused to his bail. The
holding in the Leary case, however, is not by any means that a court
must accept willy nilly any bail offered to it. Witness the most recent
pronouncement by any Federal court on the subject, Concord Casualty
and Surety Co. v. United States.71 There the lower court had entered
an order restraining the plaintiff from acting as surety or indemnitor in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York for three
years. While it reversed the order on the ground that the District Court
had no power to enter it, the Circuit Court of Appeals said:
"The Court is not without protection if the surety company is deemed a
poor moral or unsafe risk.... Like any other financial risk in giving an undertaking or guaranty, a moral risk as well as the material risk is involved. It
is the personal responsibility-the presence of the prisoner-that a bail bond
requires. When a defendant is called upon to pay his obligation to society,
it is not the sum of the bail bond that society asks for, but rather the presence
of the defendant for imprisonment."
The earliest American case allowing a recovery on an indemnity, is
that of Reynolds v. Harral.72 The court there made no mention of the
public policy involved except to express the opinion that "no practical
mischief" would result from allowing the bail to recover from his
principal on an implied indemnity. The opinion did not cite any authorities in criminal cases, but said that no authority had been found
which gave the bail in a criminal case less rights than those enjoyed by
bail in civil cases. The obvious difference between bail in a civil case,
which is given merely as security for a sum of money, and the bail in
a criminal case, which is given as security for the production of a prisoner to answer a charge of crime, apparently never occurred to the
learned court.
This difference is illustrated by the action of the court in People v.
Ingersoll73 which was a civil action that grew out of the exposure of
the notorious Tweed ring in the City of New York. The action was tb
recover over $6,000,000. The case deals with the justification of bail
in the sum of $500,000 on behalf of Ingersoll. It appears that valuable property was conveyed by different friends of Ingersoll to his
bail prior to the attempt to justify. As the conveyances were absolute
and thus became the bail's property, the court felt that no harm was
done to the People by approving the offered bond.
A Rhode Island court upheld a contract of indemnity in Fagin v.
70.

224 U. S. 567 (1912).

71.
72.
73.

69 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
2 Strob. 87 (S. C. 1847).
14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 23 (N. Y. 1872).
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Goggin.74 Here again the court did not discuss the question of public
policy involved. In fact, the case arose on a demurrer interposed by
the plaintiff to the defendant's plea of infancy, and the only point discussed by the court was the sufficiency of the plea of infancy in an
action brought on behalf of the bail to recover from his infant principal
the sums he had been forced to pay because of the recognizance. The
court sustained the demurrer on the ground that an infant may bind
himself by any contract he is authorized by law to make, and that.the
giving of a recognizance is such a contract. This case, like the Reynolds
case, is of little help in the present discussion, In Anderson v. Spence,7
an Indiana court held that an oral contract of indemnity between the
principal and his bail is an original contract not within the Statute of
Frauds. This case went no further than did the Cripps case in England, the court not mentioning the consideration of public policy.
The first real American authority is the New York case of Maloney
v. Nelson.70 The action was one brought to foreclose a mortgage given
to Maloney, who with another was bail for one O'Brien to secure
Maloney in the event the bail was forfeited. O'Brien failed to appear
for his trial and the bail in the sum of $10,000 was, in fact, forfeited,
but it did not appear as a fact in the case that Maloney bad paid the
$10,000 penalty or any portion of it. Accordingly, judgment was rendered against Maloney, but in its opinion the court said with respect
to the defense that such a contract was against public policy:
"This leaves it unnecessary to consider the other defenses set up in the
answer of the defendant Nelson, although we must say that the claim that
the defendant's contract was void as against public policy, does not impress
us as being a good defense, at least in this state."
Subsequently, Maloney paid the $10,000, and instituted a new action.77 The Court of Appeals, sustaining the judgment of foreclosure
granted by the court below, said the indemnity was not against public
policy:
"As to the second ground relied upon to defeat the action, viz., that the
bond and mortgage were void as against public policy, the question is an
open one in this state, so far as decision is concerned, but the view of this
court was expressed in Maloney v. Nelson (supra). The court said: 'This
leaves it unnecessary to consider the other defenses set up in the answer of
the defendant Nelson, although we must say that the claim that the defendant's contract was void as against public policy, does not impress us as being
74.
75.

12 R. I. 398 (1879).
72 Ind. 315 (18SO).

76.
77.

144 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. 82 (1894).
158 N. Y. 351, 53 N. E. 33 (1899).
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a good defense, at least in this state.' It is true that in some other jurisdictions, as is pointed out in the very careful opinion of the Appellate Division,
it has been suggested, if not decided, that it is against public policy to allow
bail to become indemnified, the reason given being that the object for which
the bail is required is to assure theappearance of the prisoner to answer the
charge against him, and that necessarily the bail had a direct pecuniary interest in preventing the escape of the prisoner, which he would not have were
he fully indemnified. That is not the public policy of this state; for the giving
of bail in criminal cases is regulated by statute, and the legislature has, by its
provisions, provided that a personally responsible surety may be altogether
omitted if the accused prefers to make a deposit of money; he may have his
choice either to give a bond with sureties, or make a deposit of money. It is
the loss of the money deposited, or the assurance that the sureties will be
obliged to pay the amount of the bail, that is relied upon to secure the presence
of the accused. It, therefore, cannot be said to be a part of the public policy
of this state to insist upon personal liability of sureties, for there need not be
such personal liability in any case if the accused make a deposit of money in
lieu of bail, as provided by the statute."
It would be difficult to quarrel with the reasoning of the Court of
Appeals in this case, where a state, such as is the case in New York,
allows one accused of crime freedom from jail upon the making of a
mere cash or property deposit. It cannot be said that the period of
his bail is in any sense a continuation of his detention. He has no
jailer other than himself. The state looks only to his desire to preserve
his own property to assure his presence at trial. If that be so, then
the consideration so important to the English courts that there be some
person other than the accused to assure his presence and to take the
means necessary to produce him in the event he absconds, does not
exist. If the accused, instead of depositing cash or property for his
release, gives that cash or other security to another who delivers a
recognizance to the state, the state occupies precisely the same position
as it would have occupied if the accused had made a deposit of cash.
That being so, there can be no objection in principle to a contract of
indemnity in a jurisdiction which permits the release of a prisoner on
his deposit of cash or other property. In fact, there can be no objection,
since property seems to be the only reliance of the state, to the granting
to bail in a criminal case in such a jurisdiction the same rights that are
enjoyed by bail in civil cases. The decision, therefore, in Badolato v.
Molinari,78 that in New York there ran from the principal to his bail
an implied contract of indemnity is perfectly sound.
Other states have adopted the reasoning of the New York Courts.
It was on the Maloney cases that the United States Supreme Court
78.

106 Misc. 342, 174 N. Y. Supp. 512 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
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relied in the Leary case. The Court there speaking through the late
Justice Holmes, said:
"The only matters that seem to us to need argument are the questions of
public policy and laches. As to the former the ground for declaring the contract invalid rests rather on tradition than on substantial realities of the
present day. It is said that the bail contemplated by the Revised Statutes
(§ 1014) is common-law bail and that nothing should be done to diminish
the interest of the bail in producing the body of his principal. But bail no
longer is the vnundium,79 although a trace of the old relation remains in the
right to arrest. Rev. Stat. § 1018. The distinction between bail and suretyship is pretty nearly forgotten. The interest to produce the body of the
principal in court is impersonal and wholly pecuniary. If, as in this case, the
bond was for $40,000, that sum was the measure of the interest on anybody's
part, and it did not matter to the government what person ultimately felt
the loss so long as it had the obligation it was content to take. The law of
New York recognizes the validity of contracts like the one alleged, and without considering whether the law of New York controls we are content to say
merely that the New York decisions strike us as founded in good sense." 80
As a result of the decision in the Leary case, it has since been held
that the federal statute"1 does not require the giving of common law
bail, and that a District Judge
has no right to refuse to accept cash
2
bail offered by a prisoner.f
In West Virginia, a novel theory has been advanced to sustain the
holding in Carr v. Davis,83 that an indemnity running from a third person to the bail is not against public policy. In the case just mentioned,
the West Virginia Court relied on the Maloney case. It pointed out
that there were no prior West Virginia or Virginia decisions, but said
that it was a matter of general acceptance by the bench and bar that
contracts to indemnify bail were valid.8 4
79. The term, nwdiurn, was derived out of old French law and indicated a tribute paid
by a church or monastery to their seignorial avous and vidames as the price of protecting
them.

BLCx, LAW DIcTIoNARY (3d ed. 1933) 1212.

80. Leary v. United States, 224 U. S. 567, 575 (1912).
81. 'For any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any
justice or judge of the United States, or by any United States commissioner, or by any
chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of common pleas, mayor
of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any State where he may be found,
and agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such State, and at the
expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, for
trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offense." Rev.
Stat. § 1014 (1896), 18 U. S. C. A. 591 (1927).
82. Rowan v. Randolph, 268 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920).
83. 64 W. Va. 522, 63 S. E. 326 (1908).
84. In support of this contention it cited Pingrey on Suretyship, who makes a rather
startling statement that contracts to idemnify bail in criminal cases have been frequently
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The case of Carr v. Davis was decided on demurrer, and the court
holding the complaint good, remanded the case for further proceedings.
It came up again under the name of Carr v. Sutton.' The question of
public policy was again raised. The court declined to reconsider its
,decision, but held that since the bail had failed in his duty to his indemnitor to be a proper custodian or jailer of the principal, in that he
carelessly allowed the principal to escape, and did not diligently search
for him, his indemnitor was released from any obligation to indemnify
him. The Judge who wrote the opinion had dissented in the prior case,
and explained the prior case in this fashion:
"It was mainly because of this onerous duty and obligation80 imposed by
law upon bail, that the judges concurring in the opinion of the court in Carr
v. Davis, supra, were persuaded to hold a bond of indemnity given bail not
void as against public policy. Their notion was that by taking the bond bail
could not, without endangering his security, neglect or become indifferent to
the obligations of his bond. In my individual opinion the correctness of that
decision can rightly be predicated upon no other theory."
If the theory of the first case was that an indemnity agreement was
not against public policy because of the heavy duty resting on the
bail, and his need to perform that duty carefully to preserve his right
to indemnity, then the court in the first case studiously avoided all
mention of it.
Thus, we find that there are two schools of thought or theories of
law as to the validity of contracts to indemnify bail. In jurisdictions
which adhere to the old notion of bail as permitting the release of the
prisoner to one who will have a personal and property interest in producing him for trial and thus be his jailer, it is perfectly sound to hold
that an agreement to indemnify the bail, thus eliminating his interest
in producing the prisoner, since he stands to suffer no loss, is against
public policy. On the other hand, in jurisdictions where a prisoner may
secure his release by means of a mere cash or property deposit with
the court, it is equally sound to hold that contracts to indemnify the
bail are not against public policy since the state has made clear that
it is its policy not to rely on any supposed jailer but on the mere cash
and property itself, and is in as good a position if it holds the bond
of indemnified bail as it would be if it held a deposit. In jurisdictions,
however, where common law bail still exists and cash or property deenforced in the courts. The authority of Pingrey's statement is highly questionable as
is a statement made by Petersdorff to the effect that there is an implied agreement running
from the principal to the bail to reimburse the bail in the event the principal absconds.
See note 58 supra.
85. 70 W. Va. 522, 74 S. E. 239 (1912).
86. The court here is speaking about the duty of bail to a jailer or psuedo jailor.
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posits by the prisoner are not accepted, it would be unsound to hold
as valid a contract to indemnify the bail.
Only one state, Louisiana, has covered the subject by statute. The
Louisiana statute provides:
"Any contract made to indemnify any surety against loss on any bail-bond
made or to be made by such surety shall be void and any security deposited in
connection with such contract shall be forfeited to the State; provided, that
apply to surety companies legally authorized to do busithis Article shall not
87
ness in the State."
While these authorities show that up to the present time the general
trend in the American jurisdictions is to hold valid and enforceable a
contract to indemnify bail in criminal cases, the vast majority of the
states have not yet been called upon to pass on the question one way
or another, so far as the reported cases tell us.
The Socil Aspect
Which rule works better? Apparently neither is perfect. Certainly
in New York it cannot be said that the system of bail has been improved
by permitting cash deposits and upholding the validity of indemnity
agreements. On the contrary, this practice has led to abuses that have
been the subject of investigation and the cause of much concern to the
law enforcement officers of the state. 8 Many suggestions have been
made for improving the bail system in New York."0 It is noticeable that
no one who has studied the problem has found any fault with surety
companies as such."' A hint dropped by Magistrate Simpson during
87. LA. CODE Carar. Paoc. (Dart, 1932) art. 90.
38. Legis. (1921) 21 COL. L. Rxv. 592.
89. In a letter to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment dated November 16th,
1923, the Prison Committee of the Association of Grand Jurors of New York County suggested the centralization of all courts having the authority to release prisoners on bal, a
central bureau to scrutinize bail transactions, the limitation of the power to admit to bal
to a few officials, fingerprinting before fixing bail, and the refusal to bail of experienced and
professional criminals. They argued that money and property bail were a poor guarantee to
society, and pointed out that, in the first six months of 1925, forty-two prisoners out on
bail were rearrested and in all but six cases were charged with serious crimes. The same
Prison Committee writing to Hon. Caleb S. Baumes, Chairman of the New York State
Crime Commission, on October 16, 1926, denounced alliances between criminal lawyers and
bondsmei in "dingy offices". THE P.%umEL, a publication of the New York County Grand
jury in its November and December, 1933, issues, set forth twenty proposals for improving
criminal law and procedure in Federal courts, including refusal of bail to notorious offenders, making the jumping of bail a felony (it is a felony in New York, N. Y. PIa;AL
LAw § 1694 a), the abolition of bail on appeal, and the abolition of ball when a Federal
prisoner contests removal to another Federal district.
90. The October 16, 1926 letter from the Prison Committee of the Association of Grand
Jurors of New York County to Hon. Caleb S. Baumes, mentioned in the preceding note.
Legis. (1921) 21 CoL. L. Rmv. 592.
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an investigation of bail evils in 1921 that New York might discard
her present theories and go back to the older practice has been adversely
criticized as overlooking "the altered social conditions which have made
bail impersonal; these cannot be changed back by legislation." 1 Just
what social conditions have been changed, and how they have been
changed, so as to render impossible a return to the system of personal
bail, is not made clear. There is no indication, for example, that the
operation of the older theory in England, a country whose social conditions are not so very foreign to our own, has worked any great injustice. One cannot help but be impressed in any discussion of the
relative merits of the two practices, by the strong dissenting opinion in
the West Virginia case of Carr v. Davis, 2 wherein it is said:
"Public policy and the law demand a different decision. The poorest man,
if honest, can find bail. The richest man, for whom those knowing him would
not vouch without indemnity, should not be allowed to furnish bail by virtually
purchasing it. The mere fact that indemnity is furnished indicates that confidence is not reposed. Bail is a matter of confidence and personal relation.
It should not be made a matter of contract or commercialism .... Upholding

indemnity, in any form, under contract implied or express, in effect, allows
one to be his own surety for his appearance. Thus he or his friends may buy
his freedom from answering the law. This was never contemplated. And we
should not permit it to be contemplated now that the question is one of the
first instance here. Why provide for a bail piece, intended to promote justice,
and then destroy its effect and utility? Why open the door to barter freedom
from the law for money?"
The paramount consideration of the state in releasing an accused
person prior to his trial is, and should be, that he will be present when
his trial is called. If an accused person is permitted to deposit cash or
property, or to indemnify those who go bail fot him by giving the cash
or property to them instead of delivering it to the court, the temptation
to jump bail is undoubtedly great. Only thus can the large number of
forfeitures that bother our criminal courts be explained. If, on the
other hand, he is not permitted to secure his freedom by a mere dedeposit of cash and property and is not permitted to indemnify his
bail, surety companies will likely withdraw from the bail bond business,
and the accused person will be forced to obtain personal bail.
Personal bail is not, of course, perfect. Its requirement opens the
field to the professional bondsmen. 93 The professional bondsmen, however, can easily be regulated by statutes establishing central bail bureaus
91. Legis. (1921) 21 COL. L. R~v. 594.
92. 64 W. Va. 522, 535, 63 S. E. 326, 331 (1908).
93. Bruxy, op. cit. supra note 27, at 39 et seq.
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which maintain a ready record of all the bondsmen's transactions, and
making every bail bond a lien on the bondsmen's property. Such
statutes have already been suggestedf' It would seem that a return
to the older practice, the elimination of a cash or property deposit by
the accused, the barring of contracts to indemnify bail and of the delivery
of security-to bail and the meticulous regulation and control of professional bondsmen, thus at one and the same time preventing straw bail
and forcing those accused of crime to secure personal bail, would go
a long way toward eliminating forfeitures, not to mention the scandalous
situation caused by criminals on bail continuing their criminal careers.
Certainly it could hardly produce a state of affairs any worse than that
under which many American jurisdictions now suffer.
Not everything new is better than everything old. This is especially
true of practices involving the human element. Perhaps our forefathers
were wiser in their generation than we are in ours. There is nothing
to be lost by a return to the older method. Such a change is nothing
more or less than a renewed substitution of real bail for bail in name,
the latter being strikingly similar in effect to the mainprize of ancient
days, which was abandoned in favor of bail coupled with the jailer
element. It can be accomplished by simple statutory enactments. It
may well result in a better administration of our law. There is no reason
why it should cause any injustice to those accused of crime, for to quote
again the dissenting opinion in the Carr case:
"The poorest man, if honest, can find bail. The richest man, for whom
those knowing him would not vouch without indemnity, should not be allowed
to furnish bail by virtually purchasing it. The mere fact that indemnity is
furnished indicates that confidence is not reposed." 0 5
94. See the Communications of the Prison Committee of the Association of Grand
Jurors of New York County, note 88 -uPra.
95. Carr v. Davis, 64 W. Va. 522, 535, 63 S. E. 326, 331 (1908).

